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The Search for unity
Angels Fear: Towards an Episternology of the Sacred by Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine
Bateson. New York: Macmillan, 1987. 224 pages. $18.95 (hard).
Klaus Krippendorff
University of Pennsylvania
Angels Fear is Gregory Bateson’s well-founded fear for a culture, our culture, that may destroy
itself by its very success. The book goes much deeper than the usual fears of atom bombs,
genetic advances, and ecological disasters into the deep structure of these phenomena and roots
them in mind, both human and social.
Although his Mind and Nature did some of this before, the warning in Angels Fear is clearer,
tied to epistemology and to such concepts as dichotomy, logical typing, mythology (storytelling),
information, redundancy, pattern and structure, circularities, description, the role of the
unconscious, faith, etc. Many of these ideas are drawn from cybernetics and are extended here to
human communication, social process, and culture. One could say that it is Norbert Wiener’s
program carried into the eighties and beyond, though much more tentative and caring.
Angels Fear is far less coherent than Steps to an Ecology of Mind and Mind and Nature, even
with Mary Catherine Bateson’s carefully constructed connective metalogues between chapters.
They too raise important issues but often without making the effort of developing them toward
some kind of conclusion. One can clearly feel Bateson’s shortage of time before his untimely
death and perhaps the editor’s effort to preserve much of the material in its raw form. More than
his other publications, Angels Fear seems reflective of a Bateson who was for most of his life at
the cutting edge of thinking but, because he pushed the breakthrough point in front of him, never
enjoyed the satisfaction of having gotten there. Perhaps there is a deep connection between his
always almost getting there and his conservatism.
I particularly like how he contrasts his own approach with the California counter-culture in
which he thrived and which made him into a guru. He could have taken a scientific perspective
and dismissed certain practices and beliefs as untenable or meaningless; but in search of
affirmative knowledge for “the sacred that would celebrate natural unity,” Bateson positioned
himself instead right “between the Scylla of established materialism with its quantitative
thinking, applied science, and ‘controlled’ experiments on the one side, and the Charybdis of
romantic supernaturalism on the other” (p. 64). In this respect his position resembles that of Carl
Gustav Jung (whose “Seven Sermons to the Dead” led Bateson to the concepts of Pleroma and
Creatura), who was equally unwilling to settle on either side of a distinction and instead
advocated the search for a unity as well.
Is this a good book? I don’t really know. Is it an important book? That depends on whether you
are willing to look and able to remain sufficiently open to ponder the wide-ranging and unevenly
distributed ideas. I for one found many mindboggling and am sure I will read the book many
times for ideas yet to be discovered. Concerning his own epistemology, for example, the claim
that “the gap between the observer and the supernatural is covered by faith” (p. 96) makes

Bateson far from being a naive realist, as some have accused him. He did not talk about the gap
between the observer and the observed, the supernatural being beyond perception and a cognitive
construction above the construction of the ordinary. Add to this “faith is believing that seeing is
believing” (pp. 96-97) and his construction becomes a self-referential one, one that is
constitutive of seeing. This links his work to radical constructivism, to which it brings concepts
from psychiatry (the unconscious) and religion (the sacred and faith) and shows a deep concern
for the wellbeing (absence of pathologies) of mind.
With a book so rich in ideas (at least for me) it is impossible to describe the chapters or examine
its contributions. Let me therefore mention only a couple of uncertainties of my own. One has to
do with easily misleading words. For example, Bateson had previously defined information as
“any difference that makes a difference.” This is a very seductive definition. Its first noun
apparently locates differences in reality outside the human receiver-the difference between paper
and ink, to use his example-and its second use of the same noun refers to the relative importance
of this difference. Both paint the receiver as passive and merely responding to what an existing
difference does. I am not sure whether Bateson intended this, in view of his later assertion (p.
166) that data are always made by observers (are descriptions of descriptions, forms of forms).
Suppose observers, who see themselves as receiving information, actively differentiate whether
there is a difference to begin with or whether the act of differentiation creates this difference as
an important one. If this is so, information ought to be defined in receivers’ terms and include a
voluntaristic element. With all his emphasis on epistemology one could have expected greater
clarity, at least on concepts that are essential enough to be listed in his glossary.
Another uncertainty, perhaps the same as the above but reaching further, concerns his unyielding
reliance on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Logical Types. Bateson owes many productive
concepts to this theory, and it is undoubtedly true not only that “the map is not the territory” but
also that the map, being about a territory, is on a logical level above the territory it claims to
represent. The Theory of Logical Types implies a hierarchy of logical types that supports an
epistemology which in turn justifies social hierarchies. In fact Bateson devotes a whole chapter
to the basic idea of feedback as a model for his approach and shows how one feedback loop is
embodied in a part of a whole that embodies a higher-order feedback loop, which in turn may be
embedded in a still higher-order loop, etc. The control hierarchy this entails very much resembles
the social construction of industrial and military organizations. I can’t deny the usefulness of
such creations, but they may be faulty on the bottom, on the top, and in between.
On the bottom, the distinction among logical types makes sense only if one can compare the map
with the territory. Bateson recognizes that the territory belongs to Jung’s Pleroma, which “has no
map, no names, no classes and no members of classes” (p. 21). How can we then compare such a
formless and unknowable entity with its map? Yes, “the map is not the territory”; but there is no
territory without a map. They mutually define each other, and any use of maps involves us in a
constitutive (self-defining) circularity that is explicitly ruled out in the Theory of Logical Types.
On the top, the end is out of sight as well but for different reasons. As soon as we want to explain
(make a map of) the master controller, we must resort to a logical level higher than that
controller and construct a super controller who in turn needs to be explained by a hyper
controller, etc. The infinite regress this entails is not inherent in nature but in the Theory of

Logical Types, as well as the desire to explain things. Bateson takes the theory as a logical
standard when complaining that “most local epistemologies-personal and cultural- continually
err, alas, in confusing map with territory and in assuming that the rules for drawing maps are
imminent in the nature of that which is being represented in the map” (p. 21). I am convinced
that the epistemology Bateson chides for erring may not be so pathological. It is an epistemology
in which the top is reentered on the bottom and thus supports itself. Such a circularity (not to be
confused with the circular causality of ordinary feedback) underlies Spencer Brown’s Laws of
Form, Francisco Varela’s calculus of self-reference, Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy’s Liar,
and Heinz von Foerster’s second-order cybernetics to name but a few-and is constructive of
several autologies (autopoiesis, for example). Somehow I wonder if Bateson’s Fear stems from
being held captive by the Theory of Logical Types. Ecology, which he knows so well and draws
on in many instances, is hardly hierarchical.
In the middle, the Theory of Logical Types leaves little choice. In control hierarchies, obedience
to the level above is passed on as oppression to the level below, perhaps in support of a common
goal. In descriptive hierarchies (descriptions, descriptions of descriptions, . . . descriptions of. .
.descriptions) the syntax is fixed from above and the choice of terms is constrained by the
content to be described. Either one leaves out self-determination, autonomy, and mind. The only
way to get rid of these logical consequences is to replace the restrictive Theory of Logical Types
with a theory that allows circularities to enter and that can then explain, among other things, why
belief in the Theory of Logical Types reifies itself in all kinds of hierarchies whose experiential
consequence almost always is oppression.
Bateson and Jung-to make a last observation-seem to have more in common than is often
realized. The work of both is committed to science but also is prophetic. Both have probed deep
into the unconscious, including their own. Bateson was an anthropologist, close to family
therapy, and relied on cybernetic concepts; Jung was a psychoanalyst and relied on his own
psychiatric practice. But whereas Bateson generalized a cybernetic notion of mind to the
functioning of culture, Jung relied on culture (mythology and symbolism) to shed light on
psychological realities inside individual beings. Most curiously, they came to rather different
conclusions. Whereas Jung’s fear for the survival of humankind is founded in the fear that
individuals might not come to grips with their own unconscious, might not be able to balance
and transcend the dichotomies language creates and prevent these oppositions from taking over
their lives, Bateson’s fear is rooted in just the opposite: that a certain core of things should be left
in the unconscious, untouched, unanalyzed, and not talked about for fear that tampering with
these might destroy the very fabric of society, the very ecological balance that enabled us to be.

